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In the

SUPREME COURT
o,f the

STATE OF UTAH
CARL NELSON DAY,
Plaintiff and App·ellant,
vs.

J. GEORGE JONES, JR., and MRS.
J GEORGE JONES, JR., his wife,

Case No.
7466

whose true and correct na:rpe is
otherwise unknown,
Defendants atnd Respondents.

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
FACTS OF THE CASE
Plaintiff commenced this action against the two
named defendants in the District Court of · Millard
County, Utah, to recover actual damages for the taking
and disposing of a crop of grain, the property of the
plaintiff, and exemplary damages by reason of the will3
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ful and malicious nature of the actions of such defendants in so taking and disposing of the plaintiff's such
property. (Record p. 1-5.)
The District Court sustained (Record p. 15) a general demurrer of the said defendants to plaintiff's complaint, whereupon plaintiff filed his Amended Complaint
herein (Record p. 17-21). The defendants filed their
general demurrer to such Amended Complaint and also
filed their answer thereto (Record p. 24-27). The plaintiff filed his Reply to such answer (Record p. 30-31).
Thereafter the District Court sustained the general demurrer to the Amended Complaint (Record p. 32). The
plaintiff having failed '"and refused to file a further
amended complaint, the District Court made and entered
its Judgment of Dismissal (Record p. 33) from \vhich
judgment the plaintiff appealed to the. Supreme Court
of Utah which Court ordered the case remanded to the
District Court with directions to set aside the order of
dismissal entered therein and the order sustaining the
demurrer and take proper further proceedings. (Carl
Nelson Day v. J. George Jones, Jr., et ux, Case No. 7288,
Supreme Court of Utah) (Record p. 38-39). This case
was then tried upon the pleadings then before the Court.
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's introduction of evidence the defendants each moved the Court for Judgment of Nonsuit or in the alternative for judgment for
·nominal damages only (Record p. 46; Transcript p. 4142); whereupon the court rendered judgment for nonsuit
as to the defendant Mrs. J. George Jones, Jr., and for
plaintiff against the defendant J·. George Jones, Jr., for
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nominal damages only in the amount of $1.00 (Record
p. 51-52; Transcript p. 43-44), from 'Yhieh judgment plaintiff no'Y appeals.
The facts are that plaintiff purchased the following
described property situated in Millard County, Utah, on
22 1\fay 1940 and ever since has been and now is the legal
o"~ner and entitled to the immediate and exclusive possession thereof (Record p. 17 and 24). Such property is
described as follows:
The North one-half of the Southwest quarter
of Section 34, Township 20 South, Range 5 West,
S. L. B. & 1\I.
The defendant J. George Jones, Jr., on or about 28
May 1943 for the sum of $31.07 procured from Millard
County a quit claim deed to such land (Record p. 17, 24
and 47). Such deed and sale by Millard County were at
all times mentioned and now are void (Record p. 17 and
24). Plaintiff in writing and by mail notified such defendant on or about 1 August 1943 and again on or about
20 March 1944 that plaintiff was the owner of the land
and claimed the same, and advised such defendant that
plaintiff was in the l\!ilitary Service of the United States
at the time of such void sale by Millard County and that
the provisions of the Soldiers' and Sailors Civil Relief
Act of 1940 with its amendments would govern such sale
(Record p. 17; Transcript p. 35; Exhibits 1 and 2).
Thereafter in the year 1945 the said defendants went
upon the plaintiff's said lands and commenced to farm
and crop the same.
5
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On 15 July 1946 plaintiff commenced an action in
the District Court of Millard County, Utah, against the
defendants named herein, and others, to quiet title to
said property. The said defendants were each duly
served with Summons and copy of the complaint therein
on 16 July 1946 (Record p. 18, 24 and 47).
Thereafter in the fall of the year 1946, the said defendants again prepared the said land for planting and
did plant another crop of grain thereon (Record p. 18,
24, 26 and 47). Thereafter the said defendants did by
their pleadings in the said action set up claims against
the plaintiff for and in connection with the said newly
planted crop of grain, and at the trial of the said action
before the said District Court on 4 and 5 December 1946,
all of the matter of the rights and claims of the said defendants against the said plaintiff and in and to the said
land and the said alleged improvements and the said
crop was fully presented to the said Court for determination and was fully and completely litigated in the said
action (Record p. 18-19, 25 and 47).
The said District Court on or about 12 March 1947
did make and enter its Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law and Decree in the said action wherein and whereby the said Court adjudged and determined that the
plaintiff was the owner absolute and in fee simple and
entitled to the immediate possession of the said lands
and premises and the alleged improvements including the
said crop which were thereon and a part thereof, and
that all of the claims and pretensions of the said defend6
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nuts ns contained in their said pleadings, or whatever,
\\·ere \Yithout good faith, "'t)re "·ithout right, and were
perpetually estopped, enjoined and barred (Record p.
19, 23, 26 and 47; last paragraph of Supreme Court decision,Day r. Jo-nes, X o. 706~, in Exhibits envelope).
Thereafter by Yirtue of the said Findings, Conclusion and Decree in the said action the plaintiff did on
or about 15 ~larch 1947 peac.eably enter upon his said
premises "'"ith the intention of taking and assuming possession thereof including the said crop of grain then
gro,ving upon the said premises and being a part thereof,
and the plaintiff did remain upon and did work upon the
said premises repairing fences thereon for several days
(Record p. 19 and 48; Transcript p. 33 through 40).
Thereafter on or about 19 1Iarch 1947 the said defendants, by and through their agents and employees,
did belligerently and by show of force eject and remove
the plaintiff from his said lands and premises and did
re-enter and reassume possession thereof, and said defendants did thereupon continue in possession of the
said lands and premises until on or about 16 December
1947, the time at which remittiter was made to the District Court by the Supreme Court in the first action as
herein below set forth (Record p. 19 and 48; Transcript
p. 34 to 40).
About or during the month of July 1947 the ·said
defendants harvested, removed and carried away from
the said lands the said crop of grain, being 2383.68
bushels of \vheat the property of the plaintiff, and did

7
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assume and exercise the right of ownership over such
crop of grain to the exclusion of the plaintiff's rights
therein, and did sell or otherwise dispose of the said
crop of grain, and since such time have been and now are
unable to deliver the same to plaintiff (Record p. 19-20,
25 and 48; Transcript p. 13, 15, 16, 17, 18 and 19).
The matter of the rights and claims of the said defendants against the plaintiff and in and to the said
land, the alleged improvements and the said crop, was by
appeal of such action by the said defendants fully presented to the Supreme Court of the State of Utah and
was fully litigated therein (Carl Nelson Da.y v. J. George
Jones, Jr., et al., case number 7062, reported in 187 P.
(2d) at page 181) (Record p. 20, 25, 26 and 49). This
court did unanimously on or about 24 November 1947
duly affirm the decision of the District Court in the said
case, and did affirm the holding of the trial court that
the actions of the said def en dan ts with regard to the
alleged improvements and the said crop were not in good
faith. Remittiter to the District Court was duly made
on or about 16 December 1947, and such judgment and
decree of said District Court, so affirmed, is now in full
force and effect and unchanged (Record p. 20, 25, 49;
Supreme Court decision in case No. 7062, in Exhibits'
envelope).
All of the actions of the said defendants relating to
the said crop of grain were willful, wrongful, malicious,
unlawful, fraudulent, with full knowledge in them of the
plaintiff's O"\Vnership of and claim to the said land and
8
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the said crop, \Yith full knowledg-e in them of the commencement of the said artion, of the pendency thereof
and of the judgment and decree of the court therein, with
"'"anton disregard of the plaintiff's rights therein, \vithout the consent of the plaintiff or any rightful authority
\vhatever, \vithout good faith, but \Yith evil intention to
take unconscientious advantage of the plaintiff ( Transcript p. 9, 13, 1±, 15, 16, 17, and 4±).
The said crop of grain, being 2383.68 bushels of
wheat, has a fluctuating market value; it has been of a
market value of $2.35 per bushel, or $6,078.38 total value,
sinee the time of the "rrongful taking and disposal thereof by, the ·said defendants (Record p. 48; Transcript p.
24, 27, 32).
The defendants by their wrongful and willful taking and disposal of plaintiff's said crop of grain have
damaged plaintiff in the amount of $6,078.38 actual damages; and by reason of the willful, wanton, malicious and
wrongful nature of such actions on the parts of said
defendants, plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendants the further sum of $3,000.00 as exemplary damages.
The above statement of facts is in substance the
admitted and proven facts as shown by the pleadings
and the evidence introduced at the trial of this action
now before the Court.
To assist this Court 1n understanding the matter
completely, however, it is felt the following facts should
be presented her-e also :
9
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On or about 20 March 1947, a day or so after plaintiff was ejected from his premises by the said defendants
as herein set forth, the District Court made its order
staying the execution of its Decree previously made and
entered therein, and on or about 25 March 1947 'the said
defendants filed therein Notice of Appeal and what was
termed Undertaking for Costs and to Stay Execution.
The said undertaking was in the amount of $300 as required under Section 104-41-7 U.C.A. 1943 and the further sum of $1,000 allegedly under Section 104-41-11.
The plaintiff filed his motion to require an increase in
the amount of the stay bond to the sum of $6,400 and to
require ·a conformance with the provisions of the said
Section 104-41-11 U.C.A. 1943. The said District Court,
after two hearings thereon, did require an additional
bond of $948 which was provided by the said defendants.
POINTS FOR REVERSAL
The points upon which appellant relies for a reversal of the judgment of the District Court in this
· rna tter are :
1. Possession of premises by defendants at time
crop harvested immaterial as defendants' rights and
claims in crop were res judicata.
2. Possession of premises by defendants at time
crop harvested immaterial as defendants' rights and
claims in crop "\\rere barred by statute.
3. Possession of premises by defendants at time
crop harvested immaterial as defendants' rights and
10
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claims in crop \\Tere lost and barred by plaintiff's taking
possession of premises \Yhile crop growing thereon.
4. Effect of supersedeas bond is solely to stay enforcement of judgment and does not nullify, void or suspend the judgment.
5. Action in troYer for conversion or in nature of
action on the case.
6. Disposal of subject of action pending appeal is
contempt of both trial and appellate courts.
7. Award of nominal damages erroneous where
plaintiff clearly entitled to substantial damages.
8. Plaintiff entitled to exemplary damages by
reason of the willful, wanton, malicious and wrongful
nature of defendants' actions.

ARGU~!ENT

POSSESSION ·OF PREMIS.ES BY DEFENDANTS AT
TIME CROP HARVESTED IMMATERIAL AS DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS AND CLAIMS IN CROP WERE
RES JUDIC'ATA.

In the case at bar the District Court in its Order
Sustaining Demurrer (Record p. 15) to plaintiff's original complaint, based its such order, as stated therein,
upon a "consideration of authorities cited in 17 Corpus
Juris at page 381, Section 7." The cases referred to in
this citation are cases in which the possessor of land,
such possession being either rightful or wrongful, plants,
11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

cultivates and harvests crops thereon. The general rule
given in these cases is that the crops belong to the one
so planting, cultivating and harvesting provided he remain continuously in possession of the land and crops
until after such time as the crops are harvested.
The District Court at the argument of the demurrer
to the amended complaint stated that the court felt the
reasoning as referred to in such Order Sustaining Demurrer to the original complaint would apply also to
the amended complaint, and it is upon such reasoning
that the District Court made and entered its Order
Sustaining Demurrer to Amended Complaint (Record
p. 32) and the Judgment of Dismissal (Record p. 33),
and it is upon the same reasoning that the District Court
entered the present judgment in this case (Transcript p.
43), from which judgment plaintiff no'v appeals.
It is the contention of the plaintiff and appellant
that the fact or not of possession by the said defendants
herein of the premises at the time the said crop was
harvested is immaterial under the facts and circumstances of this particular case at bar.
The case at bar is distinguished completely from
the class of cases referred to in the District Court's
Order Sustaining Demurrer, by the fact that in the case
at bar the "matter of the rights and claims of the swid
defendants against the plaintiff and in a.ncl to the said
lands and the alleged improvements including the said
crop was at the trial of the said action in December
1946 fully presented to the said Court for determina-
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tion anJ. loas fully litigated in the said action." This ~is
the \\yarding of Paragraph 6 of the said Amended Complaint (Record p. 18, 19), \Yhich is admitted by the said
defendants both in their general demurrer to the said
·"'
amended complaint and in their Answer to Amended
Complaint (Record p. 25) ; and it is the substance of
parag-raph 6 of the Findings of Fact in this case (Record
p. 47). These claims of the defendants in and to the crop
were denied by the trial and Supreme Courts in the said
prior action between the parties. Paragraph 7 of the
Findings of F1 act in this case, drawn by counsel for defendants, correctly sets forth that the Court in the former case
''determined and adjudged that the plaintiff was
the owner absolute and in fee simple and entitled
to the immediate possession of said lands and
premises and the improvements made thereon, including the said growing crop of wheat.'' (Record
p. 47).
30 A rnerican Jurisprudence 920 : ''It is a

fundamental principle of jurisprudence that material facts or questions which were in issue in a
former action, and were there admitted or judicially determined, are conclusively settled by
a judgment rendered therein, and that such facts
or questions become res judicata and may not
again be litigated in a subsequent action between
the same parties or their privies, regardless of
the form the issue may take in the subsequent
action, whether the subsequent action involves
the same or a different form of proceeding, or
\Vhether the second action is upon the same or a
different c.ause of action, subject matter, claim,
or demand, as the earlier action. In such ca~es,
it is also immaterial that the two actions are based

13
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on different grounds, or tried on different
theories, or instituted for different purposes, and
seek different relief."
(Citing many cases, including the following):

Smith v. Clark, 37 Utah 116, 106 P. 653, 26
L.R.A. N.S. 953. At page 660 of 106 Pacific Reporter, this Court states: "On the face of the
judgment and pleadings in the replevin action
offered in evidence it affirmatively appears that
both the ownership and right of possession of the
property were actually litigated and directly determined, and that the determination of both such
questions was necessary to the judgment. The
right of possession was there made dependent
upon the question of o"\vnership. When in a subsequent action, though in a different form, such
questions recur between the same parties, and
are again raised and litigated, such former adjudication is, upon such questions, not only competent, but binding, evidence.''
Barnk of America v. 11fcLa.ughlin Co., 40 Cal.

App. (2d) 620, 105 P. (2d) 607, certiorari denied,
61 Sup. Ct. 958, 313 U.S. 571, 85 L. Ed. 1529, in
a· consideration of res judicata cites the law as
follows:
34 Cor pus J tttris 922 : ''If the questions involved in a suit are tried and decided, no matter
how numerous they may be, the estoppel of the
judgment will apply to each point so settled, in the
same degree as if it were the sole issue in the
case.
34 Cor pus Juris 773 : ''A general affirmance
of a judgment on appeal makes it res judicata as
to all the issues, claims, or controversies involved
in the action and passed upon by the court below,
although the appellate court does not consider or
decide all of them.''
14
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And at page 614 of 105 P. (2d), the court
states as follows : '' ~ * • the question of the
finality of the judgment is answered in the reeent case of Sutphin v. Speik, Cal. Sup. 99 P. (2d)
652, 655, "~here the court said: 'Next is the question, under "~hat circumstances is a rna tter to be
deemed decided by the prior judgment~ Obviously, if it is actually raised by proper pleadings
and treated a.s an issue in the cause, it is conclusively determined by the first judgment. But
the rule goes further. If the matter ~vas within
the scope of the action, related to the subject ma.tter and relevant to the issues, so that it could
have been raised, the judgment is conclusive on
it despite the fact that it uJas not in fact exp,ress.Zy
pleaded or otherwise urged. The reason for this
is manifest. A party cannot by negligence or de·sign withhold issues and litigate them in consecutive actions. Hence the rule is that the prior
judg1nent is res judicata on matters wlvich w~ere
rai.sed or could have been rarised, on matters
litigated or litigable." (citing cases.)
34 Corpus Juris 827, 828: ''Where a. demand
or right of action is in its nature entire and indivisible, it cannot be split up into several causes
of action and sued piecemeal, or made the basis
of as many separate suits, but a recovery on one
part will bar a subsequent action for the whole,
the residue, or another part. A like rule forbids
the splitting of defenses, or set-offs and counterclaims." (citing many cases).
See also:

East :Jfill Creek Water Co. v. Salt Lake City,
Utah, 159 P. (2d) 863 at 866; Clegg v. Schvaneveldt, 79 Utah 195, 8 P. (2d) 620; Jeremy Fuel
Co. v. Mellen, 50 Utah 49, 165 P. 791; Logarn City
v. Utah Power & Light Co., 86 Utah 340, 16 P.
(2d) 1097. Affirmed on rehearing, 86 Utah 354,
15
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44 P. (2d) 698; Peay v. Salt Lake City, 11 Utah
331, 40 P. 206, 208; Everill v. Swan, 20 Utah 56,
57 P. 716, 718.
34 Corpus Juris 921: "The great preponderance of authority sustains the rule that the
estoppel of the judgment covers all points tvhich
were actually litigated and which actually determined the verdict or ji1~dings, whether or not
they were technically in issue on the face of the
pleadings.''
Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City Water Co.,
54 Utah 10, 174 P. 1134, cites and follows 34
Corpus Juris 501 as follows:
''A judgment should be so construed as to
give effect to every \vord and part of it, including such effects and consequences as follow by
necessary legal implication from its terms, although not expressed. 23 Cyc. 1101. ''
See also Snow v. West, 37 Utah 528, 110 P. 52,
to the effect that ''Common sense should not be
lost sight of entirely (in construing a judgment)
merely because a court acts in conformity to certain rules of evidence.''
The case of Boland v. Nihlros, 79 Utah 331, 10 P. 2d
930, is quite similar to the case at bar. In that case the
owner of land brought an action to recover land, the
defendants claimed possession and set up claim for the
making of valuable improvements. Upon a trial judgment was had for the plaintiff and denying the defendants claims, which was affirmed on appeal. The
defendants then filed a petition to adjudicate the value
of the improvements and recover the same. The matters
were held to be res adjudicata by the trial court, and
this court affirmed the same on appeal.

16
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POSSESSIO·N OF PREMISES BY DEFENDANTS AT
TIME CROP HARVESTED IMMATERIAL AS DEFE.NDANTS RIGHTS AND CLAIMS IN CROP WERE BARRED
BY STATUTE.

In the first artion bet\Yeen the parties hereto the
defendants set up their rights and claims in and to the
said crop by their counterclaims in that first action,
'\Thich rights and claims the plaintiff denied. Such claims,
as above noted, were fully litigated and determined adYerse}y to defendants in the prior action.
At the time pertinent to this case the Utah statutes
provided as follows :
104-9-1 UCA 1943: "The answer of the defendant must contain:
( 1)

A general or specific denial * * * etc.

(2) A statement of any new matter constituting a defense or counterclaim.''
104-9-2 UCA 1943: The counterclaim mentioned in the next preceding section must be one
existing in favor of a defendant and against a
plaintiff, between whom a several judgment might
be had in the action, and arising out of one of
the follo\ving causes of action:
( 1) A cause of action arising out of the
transaction set forth in the complalnt as the
foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or connected
with the subject of the action.
104-9-3 UCA 1943: "If
to set up a counterclaim in
in the first subdivision of
section, neither he nor his

the defendant omits
the cases mentioned
the next preceding
assignee can after-
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wards maintain an action against the plaintiff
therefor.''
The case of Jeremy Fuel & Grain Co. v. Mellen, 50
U. 49, 165 P. 791 at 794, with reference to Section 2970
of Comp. Laws 1907 which is identical with 104-9-3 UCA
1943, holds that the bar provided for by this section is
entirely apart from the question of res adjudicata.

Logan City v. Utah Po~ver & Light Co., 86 Utah
340, 16 P. 2d 1097 at 1101, holds that:

"* * * it is duty of a party to interpose
such defense as it may have to an action brought
against it, and if it fails to do so, resulting judgment is conclusive against it as to all matters of
defense which were or might have been interposed."
Witht reference to the case at bar, the defendants
Jones had in the previous action between the parties
he-reto set up their claims to the said crop, and such
claims were fully litigated in the said former action, the
said defendants vigorously contending that they were
entitled to the crop and the plaintiff just as vigorously
contending that they were not entitled to anything.
Now under the above authorities, if the said defendants had any further claims to make with regard to the
said crop they must of necessity have presented them
in the former action, and having failed to do so they
are bound by the judgment therein.
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50 Corpus Juris Secu·ndu1n 134 states the rule as
follo,vs:
'• If a. defendant, haYing a demand against
plaintiff pleads it as a set-off or counterclaim
in the action, he must make the most of his opportunity and exhibit his whole damage, for the
judg·ment in the action ''Till prevent him from
after\Yard using the same matter, or any part of
it, as a separate cause of action against the former plaintiff, or as a. defense or counterclaim
in any subsequent action bet,veen them, whether
such set -off or counterclaim 'vas allowed or disallowed.''
The case of Salt Lake City v. Telluride Power Co.,
82 Utah 607, 17 P. 2d 281, rehearing denied 82 Utah 622,
26 P. 2d 822, gives the la'Y in Utah as to the method of
construing prior decrees. Syllabus' 1 and 2 of that case
include the holding of that case in this regard. I quote:
Syl. 1 : ''In construing decree-, court may
refer to pleadings in case and issues joined thereunder to explain and limit language of decree.''
Syl. 2: ''Terms of decre-e should be construed t_ogether as whole so as to give effect to
all of terms, if possible.''
In that case the court referred to the abstract of
proceedings in the prior case to determine from statements of counsel and the trial court just what the issues
were and how the prior decree should be construed.
In the case at bar it is admitted by the defendants
and found by the trial court that all of the defendants
rights and claims in and to tbe said crop were fully liti-
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gated in the said :first action and such rights and claims
were denied, and judgment was adverse .to the said defendants and in favor of the plaintiff. Under the above
authorities there can be no question but that the purported rights and claims of the defendants in and to the
said crop were and are barred by the Utah statute.
POSSESSION OF PREMISES BY DEFENDANTS AT
TIME CROP HARVESTE.D IMMATERIAL AS DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS AND CLAIMS IN CROP WERE LOST.
AND BARRE.D BY PLAINTIFF'S TAKING POSSESSIO~N
OF PREMISES WHILE CRO·P GROWING THEREON.

In the case at bar upon the making and entering of
the District Court judgment in the prior action, the
plaintiff peaceaoly entered upon and assumed possession
of the premises and the crop. At this point the law is
definite that the crop ownership would pass to the plaintiff, even if the matter of the rights and claims of the
defendants Jones in and to the crop had not been litigated fully in the prior action and determined against
the said defendants and in favor of the plaintiff, and
were and are res judicata and also barred by the Utah
statutes.
19 Corpus Juris 1220, Ejectment: "A successful plaintiff may enter and take possession
of the premises independent of process, if he can
do so peaceably * * *. ''
15 Arne ric an J ttrisprud ence 223, 224 : '' Crops
growing on the land at the time of a recovery
of possession in ejectment are, at eommon law,
regarded as a part of the realty and pass to the
20
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plaintiff in the absenee of eYidence showing any
right of se\Teranee in favor of the other party.
This rule rl)sts on the faet that in la\v the defendant is regarded as a trespasser, and upon
the theory tlla t the crops still stan ding on the
land and affixed to the soil are part and parcel
of the land, and are not personal property, and
recoYery of the land necessarily includes such
crops. * * * The fact that the defendant in ejectment re-enters, after having been dispossessed,
and harYests the crop that \Vas growing at the
time he \Yas ejected does not affect the title of
the plaintiff thereto.'' (Citing many cases).
Pou~er

BJ ere. Co. v. JJ1 oore 1VI ere. Co., (Mont.
1918), 177 P. 406 at 407 and 408:
''Such crops are usually regarded and treated as chattels personal, subject to sale or mortgage, and levy of attachment or execution, as
other chattels are, even while still annexed to the
soil. * * * Crops of wheat and oats, while growing, are of necessity physically attached to land
and accessory to its enjoyment, and for that reason, and in that sense, and for certain purposes,
are in a variety of circumstances incidental and
accessory to land; for example, where the owner
of land sells it \vith right of immediate possession in the purchaser, and without reservation of
the emblements then standing on the land, and
the purchaser take possession before severance,
title passes to the emblements as well as to the
land * * * the lau; on this subject is well settled.
* * *' At once upon the making of the sheriff's
deed Samuell became tenant by sufferance, for
he continued in possession wrongfully. Plaintiff
could have brought that tenancy to an end, without notice, by re-entry, and if it had done so
prior to severance of the crops it would have
thereby perfected its title to, and have become
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the owner of, the crops. * * * The fact that the
crops were planted by Samuell before his occupancy became wrongful, is of no moment.''
In the case at bar the plaintiff, the owner of the
said premises and the said crop, entered upon the same
and assumed possession thereof by virtue of the Findings, Conclusions and Decree of the said District Court,
and at that time the plaintiff's ownership of the said
crop would have become complete and fixed even if the
ownership and right to possession of the crop had not
been litigated in the action and determined.in plaintiff's
favor by the said judgment. The fact that said defendants Jones thereafter ejected the plaintiff from the
premises and re-entered thereon, and said defendants
threafter filed what they termed an Undertaking to
Stay Execution pending the appeal, and harvested and
removed and disposed of the said crop pending the
appeal would not and could not revest ovvnership of
such crop in such defendants.
EFFECT OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND IS SOLELY TO
STAY ENFORCEME'NT OF JUDGMENT AND DOES NOT
NULLIFY, VOID OR SUSPEND THE JUDGMENT.
104-41-15 Utah Code Anrnotated 1943: Stay
of Judgment, etc.

"Whenever an appea.z is perfected, as provided in the preceding sections of this chapter,
it stays all further proceedings in the court below
upon the judgment or order appealed from or
upon the matter embraced therein * * * "
22
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4 Corpus J u r1~s Secu.nduJn 1149, 1150, 1151:
.L\ppeal and Error.
'~The

g-eneral rule is that the effect of a
supersedeas or stay is to suspend proceedings
and preserve the status quo pending the determination of the appeal or proceeding- in error.
* * *It* * does not authorize a.ppellant to do wh(})t
the judg-Jnent prohibits him. from doing. As a
rule it does not reverse, annul, or undo what has
already been done and in most jurisdictions the
judgment, order or decree is not vacated or annulled, nor is its validity or effect impaired thereby."

Bullion, Beck & Cha1npion 1W.in. Co. v. Eureka
Hill Jlfin. Co., 5 Utah 151,13 P.174:
Syl. 1 : ''The taking of the appeal and the
giving of the supersedeas bond does not make
void or nullify or suspend the judgment, nor an
injunction contained therein, but all affirmative
action looking to the execution of the terms of
the decree are suspended, and the district court
is empowered to punish as for a contempt any
violation of any provisions of the injunction.
(At page 175 of 13 P., the Court states):
''But the lower court could nevertheless take
such action as was necessary to hold the property
intact, and enforce a continuance of the status
quo. However, the district court, during the pendeney of the appeal, could do no act which did not
look to the holding of the subject of litigation
just as it existed when the decree was rendered.
Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U~S. 161, 3 Sup. Ct. 136.
In the exercise of its authority to preserve the
property, the district court was empowered to
punish as for contempt for the violation of any
provision of the injunction where the parties
\vere not allowing the property to remain as it
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was at the date of the decree. If this were not
so, the recovery in the appellate court might
often be a barren victory. Sixth Ave. R.R. v. Gilbert, 71 N. Y. 430; Heinlen v. Cross, 63 Cal. 44;
State v. Chase, 41 Ind. 356. ''

Bullion, Beck & Champion Min. Co. v. Eureka
Hill Min. Co., 5 Utah 182, 12 P. 660, is to the effect
that the Supreme Court of Utah could issue an
injunction to preserve the subject of the litigation pending an appeal to the United States
Supreme Court, as otherwise, ''the purpose of
the appeal will have been defeated, and the ends
of justice will not have he en reached.''
Skeen v. Pratt, 87 Utah 121, 48 P2d 457:
Syllabus 3 gives the substance of the Court's
ruling in this regard as follows :
''Sole purpose of supersedeas bond is to
stay the enforcement of the judgment or decee
pending the appeal. ' '

5Corpus Juris Secundum 1339, Appeal and
Error, Effect of Affirmance:
''Where a final judgment is affirmed on appeal in all its parts and the case is not remanded
to the lower court for further proceedings, the
controversy is at an end, the rights of the parties
in so far as involved in the litigation are conclusively adjudicated, further proceedings in the
case in both the appellate and lower courts are
precluded, and the judgment of the lower court
is in full force and effect precisely the same as
though no appeal had been taken." (Citing many
cases.)
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ACTION IN TRO·VER FOR CONVERSION OR IN
NATURE OF ACTION ON THE C'ASE.

Counsel for defendants complained and the trial
court appeared to be in doubt as to ''"hether a cause of
action for conversion "'"as stated in plaintiff's pleadings
herein. lTpon that subject reference is made to the following a nthori ties :
65 Corpus Juris 27: "The severing and removal of gro,ving crops, such as grain, hay, cotton, and the like, constitutes a conversion for
"'"hich the o'Yner may maintain an action of
trover.''
65 Corpus Juris 31: ''Regardless of whether
he came into possession of the property la,vfully
or unla,vfully, a person in possession of the personal property of another is guilty of conversion
"rhere he makes an unfounded claim or assertion
of ownership or title thereto, or treats or deals
with the property as owner.''
8 Corpus Juris Secundum 284: "The general
tort rule that one who has come into possession of
propertly lawfully cannot be held liable for conversion in the absence of demand and refusal to
delivery has been applied to bailments, but as an
exception to the general tort rule it has been held
that a bailee who asserts title hostile to his bailor,
and wrongfully appropriates the property to his
o'vn use and benefit, is guilty of an independent
act of conversion which renders him liable without previous demand by his bailor and refusal to
deliver." (Citing cases).
8 Corpus Juris Secondu1n 283: "Any conversion by a bailee will defeat any lien which
the bailee may have in the property arising out
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of the contract of bailment, and will authorize
the bailor to sue for conversion." (Citing cases).

Christensen v. Pugh, 84 Utah 440, 36 P. 2d 100, 95
ALR 608, gives general rules regarding conversion.
65 Corpus Juris 41: "An action of trover
may be brought for the failure to return property
to a person who has recovered a judgment establishing his ownership and right to possession.''
Citing:

Jackins v. Bacon, 63 Cal. App. 463, 218 P. 1027,
which is a case where the plaintiff -recovered a judgment
establishing her ownership and right to possession of
certain stock. The matter. was appealed to the California
Supreme Court and there affirmed, but the defendant
Bacon had sold the stock prior to the remittiter to the
lower court. The plaintiff thereupon brought the reported action for conversion, and on appeal judgment
for damages for conversion vvas affirmed. The court
at page 1029 of 218 P., holds:
''The defendant Baeon 's conversion of the
stock in question was consummated according to
the authorities when he \vrongfully exercised acts
of dominion over said stock in defiance of the
plaintiff's superior right thereto and interference
with her lawful right and effort to obtain control
over said property. * * * * The judgment in the
said former action only went so far as to provide
for her recovery of the specific property sued for,
and this being so, when it appeared that upon
the entry of such judgment the defendant refused
to comply with the terms thereof by delivering
up said property, and when he based his refusal
upon the ground that prior to the entry of such
26'
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judgment he had disposed of the same, the plaintiff \\·as entitlt•d to fall bark upon her action for
conversion in order to obtain that relief which
had been rendered impossible by the defendant's
refusal to romply \Yith said former judgment and
by his prior transfer of said property which rendered compliance there,Yith impossible.''

California. Laud & Con st. Co. v. H a.Zloran, 82 Utah
267, 17 P2d 209 at 211, \\'"ns an action for damages for
'"rongful appropriation of stock. Demurrer to the complaint '"as sustained and the case dismissed. Upon
appeal this court said :
"Under our Code of Civil Procedure 've are
not justified in viewing the allegations of the ·
complaint merely for the purpose of determining
"\Yhether or not sufficient facts are therein averred to state a cause of action in conversion. Comp .
. La,,~s Utah 1917, Sec. 6442, provides: 'There is
in this state but one form of civil action for the
enforcement or protection of private rights and
the redress or prevention of private wrongs.'
Sec. 6566: 'The complaint must contain * * * a
statement of the facts constituting the cause of
action in ordinary and concise language.' Under
these provisions of our Code the form in which
the action is brought is immaterial. If sufficient
facts are alleged to entitle plaintiff to relief, the
pleading will be sustained.'' (Citing: S amuell v.
IV!oore Mere, Co., 62 Mont. 232, 204 P. 376).
This California Land case was reversed and remanded with directions to reinstate the case and overrule the demurrer, as the facts sho\ved and were sufficient to maintain an
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' 'Action in the nature of an action on t~e case
for damages sustained by reason of the wrongful appropriation of such bonds or the proceeds
thereof by a tort-feasor.''

Samuell v. Moore Mere. Co., (supra) was an action
for damages for the destruction of crops. It appeared
that the plaintiff was not in the actual possession or
entitled to the immediate possession of the crops and
judgment of non-suit was entered. The appellate court
reversed such judgment and remanded for a new trial,
holding that this was in the nature of an action on the
case, and as the facts shows that plaintiff was entitled
to relief, although perhaps not for conversion, the trial
court was in error.
DISPOS.AL OF SUBJECT OF ACTION PENDING APPEAL IS CONTEMPT O~F BOTH TRIAL AND
APPE:LLATE COURTS.

In the case at bar, the defendants Jones set up their
claims and rights in and to the crop of grain as a counterclaim in the original action and invited the District Court
and the Supreme Court to weigh and determine their
such rights therein; and judgment was made and entered against them and in favor of the plaintiff, and the
said defendants \vere enjoined and estopped to make or
assert any claim thereto. However, pending the appeal,
and while the matter was being considered by this Court,
the said defendant Jones, without any consent of elther
Court or of the plaintiff, removed and disposed of the
said crop and since such time has been unable to deliver
the same to plaintiff.
28
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17 ('torpus Juris Secuudnm 13: "It is a contempt of the eourt in "·hich nu nr.tion is pending
"·illfully to dt~stroy, remove, conceal, or dispose
of, the subject matter of the litigation, and this
rule applies to persons as 'veil as to property.
~ * * The 'Yillful distribution or removal of the
subject matter of litigation pending an appeal is
a contempt of the a.ppella te court, and such action
after obtaining a stay of execution, is a contempt
of the trial court." (Citing many eases including
State c. Keller, 36 X:Jl 81, 8P2d 786; and
State v. Superior Cou,rt, 180 Wash. 115, 39
P~<I 388 at 390: "Relator appeared in the divorce
action and 'Yaged a contest over property rights.
By stipulation he specifically invoked the jurisdiction and requested the action of the court to
make just and equitable disposition of the property. Then, \Yithout the knowledge of the court
and "~thout the consent of either the court or the
opposing party, and while the matter in issue
w·as still under advisement, relator disposed of
the property in such a way as to render the subsequent order of the court wholly nugatory and
futile. By his stipulation he invited the court to
undertake the serious and important duty of
'veighing and determining the rights of the
parties. By his act, however, he evidenced his
intention to render the court's discharge of its
duty as futile as the dropping of a bucket into
an empty \Yell.

''The \villful disposal of the subject matter
of the litigation by the party in a pending action
is contempt of court. 13 C.,J. 9. The record in this
case discloses that relator willfully disposed of
the subject matter of the pending litigation while
its disposition was still under consideration by the
court. He nO\\'" seeks to have the court do that
which, in effect, \vould be an approval of hi~ act.
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It is a familiar maxim of equity that he who
comes into court of equity may not come with
unclean hands. Having created a situation which
is wholly inequitable and intentionally subv~rsive
of the court's solemn adjudication, relator may
not now invoke the aid of the court in an attempt
to secure favorable action toward himself.''
The defendants Jones in the case at bar evidenced
an intention to take the property, land and crop, regardless of the rights of the plaintiff therein and regardless
of the decree of the District Court, and regardless of
the decision of this Court on appeal ; and the said defendants did just that in ejecting the plaintiff from his
premises, and in harvesting and disposing of the crop
pending the appeal. The said defandants Jones did not
in any way evidence any intention to hold and conserve
the property, land and crop, pending the appeal to this
court, but on the contrary permitted the said crop to
go without irrigation so that much of it was withered
and spoiled and they immediately sold and disposed of
the crop upon harvesting it.
AWARD O·F NOMINAL DAMAGES ERR.ONEOUS
WHE·RE PLAINTIFF CLEARLY ENTITLED
TO SUBSTANTIAL DAMAGES.

In the case at bar it is clearly established that plaintiff was and is entitled to be compensated for the crop of
grain, being 2383.68 bushels of wheat which had a fluctuating market value and had a high market value of
$2.55 per bushel or total value of $6078.38 on or about the
24th day of January 1948, inasmuch as the said defend30
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ants haYe disposed of the said crop and have been and
are now unable to deliver the- same to plaintiff.
The rule is as giYen in
page 469 as follows:

~5

Corpus Juris Secundum at

'• Where both the wrong and the damages resulting therefrom are established, plaintiff is
entitled to recover substantial damages, and an
award of nominal damages only is erroneous.'' ·
(Citing cases.)
This rule, the correctness of which is not open to argument, is appropriate and should be applied in this case
now before the Court.
PLAINTIFF ENTITLED TO EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
BY REASON O·F THE WILLFUL, WANTON, MALICIOUS
AND WRONGFUL NATURE OF DEFE:NDANTS'
ACTIONS.

In this case the defendants knew of the plaintiff's
claim to the premises by written notices given in August
1943 and in March 1944 prior to the said action which ·
was commenced in July 1946. The defendants knew of
the commencement of the said first action. They knew of
their purported rights and claims in and to the said crop
being fully litigated in the said first action and determined adversely to them and in favor of the plaintiff.
They knew of the plaintiff's entry upon the said premises
with intention to take and assume possession thereof
upon the making and entering of the judgment in the said
first action and at the time when the crop was growing on
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the premises. They knew of and ordered plaintiff's
ejectment from the premises by their agents and employees, which ejectment was accomplished belligerently
and hy show of force. They evidenced no intention whatever .of holding and conserving the said crop, but on the
contrary sold and disposed of it immediately upon harvesting it. They at all times acted without the consent of
the plaintiff or of either the Trial or Supreme Courts,
or any rightful authority whatever. They at all times
acted willfully, wrongfully, and in complete, wanton and
reckless disregard of the plaintiff's rights in and to the
said crop. They completely and contemptuously disregarded the judgments and decisions of the Courts.
They acted completely without good faith, as was affirmed by the Supreme Court in the prior action, but with
evil intention to take unconscientious advantage of the
plaintiff.
/~

Rugg v. Tolman, 39 Utah 295, 117 P. 54, 57, gives the
Utah rule as to exemplary damages in the following
language:
"The law does not, and in the nature of things
cannot, allow exemplary or punitive damages for
mere negligence, although gross, nor for mistakes
that may affect the rights of others, unless some
act .or acts in.dicative of bad motives or an intention to oppress or wrongfull vex and harass another is made manifest.''
See also: llfurphy v. Booth, 36 Utah 285, 103 P. 768,
770; Tripp v. Bagley, 75 Utah 42, 282 P. 1026; Falkenber.Q v. Neff, 72 Utah 258, 269 P. 1008.
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Calho~tn

P~d ~8-!

v. [Tniversal Cred-it Co., Utah (1944), 146
at ~88, giYes the rule in a. case charging conver-

sion of an automobile by lien holder in the following
language:
'~To

justify a recovery of exemplary damages, the art rausing the injury must be done with
an evil intent and. w·ith the purpose of injuring the
plaintiff, or zc·£th such a wanto~Jl· and reckless dis·regard of h£s rights as evidences a wrongful

1notive. ''
In that case the court set aside the judgment for
punitive damages. Justice Wolfe's opinion sets forth
that the defendant had tried to act decently in the matter.
In the case at bar the defendants evidenced an intention to take and dispose of the crop regardless of the
plaintiff's rights and regardless of the judgments and
decisions of the Courts. Their willful, evil, wanton and
reckless actions in this regard warrant the full punitive
measures prayed for by plaintiff.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff and appellant submits that he is entitled to
a reversal of the judgment of the trial court made and
entered in this cause, with directions to such trial court
to enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against
the defendants for the amount of $6,078.38 as actual
damages and for the further sum of $3,000.00 as exemplary damages and for costs.
Respectfully submitted,
C. NELSON DAY,
Prose.
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